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FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: 
CAMPUS RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL 
On August 15, 1789, the First Congress met to discuss the proposed Bill 
of Rights. On the agenda for the day was a draft of what we now call the 
First Amendment, but which was their Third Amendment. It was proposed 
by a Select Committee, based in significant part on an earlier proposal 
written by James Madison. One of its two clauses provided for four separate 
and distinct expressive freedoms—apart from religious freedom, which was 
originally located in a separate clause. The four expressive freedoms were 
speech, press, the right of the people to assemble and consult for their 
common good, and petition.1 Each of these freedoms had its own history, 
content, and rationale.  
Theodore Sedgwick, a Federalist representative from Massachusetts and 
a first-rate lawyer, was the first to speak. He objected that the protection for 
freedom of speech made it redundant to spell out the rest of these rights, and 
particularly the right to assemble: 
[W]hat, said he, shall we secure the freedom of speech, and think it 
necessary, at the same time, to allow the right of assembling? If 
people freely converse together, they must assemble for that purpose; 
it is a self-evident, unalienable right which the people possess; it is 
certainly a thing that never would be called in question . . . . 
It was inappropriate, he argued, for the House to spell out the details once a 
basic right has been secured. “[I]t is derogatory to the dignity of the House 
to descend to such minutiae”; “he feared it would tend to make them appear 
trifling in the eyes of their constituents . . . .”  
John Page, a Jeffersonian Republican from Virginia, disagreed with 
Sedgwick. Freedom of assembly was not a thing that never would be called 
in question. On the contrary, he reminded Sedgwick that “such rights have 
been opposed,” that “people have also been prevented from assembling 
together on their lawful occasions.” Page is referring to William Penn, who 
was prosecuted for unlawful assembly for preaching to a Quaker crowd on 
 
1. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759–61 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). The debate is reprinted in 
many places, among them MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 832–34 (3d ed. 2017). All quotations from the debate are from the same source and will not be 
separately footnoted.  











Gracechurch Street in London. (The location of Penn’s speech is significant; 
it was on a public street.) Everyone in the room at that time would have 
known the story of Penn’s prosecution, though it is little remembered today. 
“[T]herefore,” Page argued, “it is well to guard against such stretches of 
authority, by inserting the privilege in the declaration of rights. If the people 
could be deprived of the power of assembling under any pretext whatsoever, 
they might be deprived of every other privilege contained in the clause.” 
Pay attention to Page’s worry about “pretext,” meaning an assertion of 
government authority not directly involved with speech. He does not tell us 
exactly what he is concerned about, but the context of the Penn prosecution 
provides an example. Penn could be prosecuted because he delivered his 
sermon on a public street, which is public property. If there is a 
constitutionally guaranteed freedom to assemble, there must be a place in 
which to do so. Some assemblies took place on private property, principally 
churches, taverns, and coffee houses. But those locations were typically 
limited in capacity and not always available. Most large public expressive 
gatherings were on public property, such as the Boston Commons, where 
the original Tea Party folks gathered to organize and hear speeches, or the 
public street where William Penn so famously was arrested. It took the 
Supreme Court many years to recognize that public streets, parks, and 
sidewalks must be open for people to assemble and speak,2 but the logic of 
the public forum doctrine was contained in Page’s reminder of Penn’s act 
of sermonizing on Gracechurch Street in London.  
In sum, Sedgwick regarded it as obvious that the freedom of speech 
encompassed the right of people to freely converse together, and thus to get 
together in groups for that purpose, making it unnecessary to list the 
freedom separately. But Page was correct that governmental authorities 
regarded assembly as a particularly dangerous activity and regulated it more 
strictly than more private forms of speech. It might seem obvious that 
people have the right to meet together in groups, to “freely converse 
together,” as Sedgwick put it, but the distinctive character of the assembly 
right argues for including a separate and independent protection in the First 
Amendment. John Page won the argument. Sedgwick’s motion “lost by a 
considerable majority,” according to the report in the Annals of Congress.3 
For the right to speak focuses on the message. That is why content and 
viewpoint-based regulations are subject to the strictest possible judicial 
scrutiny. The right of assembly or association focuses on something 
antecedent to the delivery of a message: on the process of formulation of 
ideas and selection of a message. A group of like-minded people—
 
2. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 













Presbyterians, say, or Democrats or veterans or the American Bar 
Association—may not even know what their message on a particular issue 
will be until they have had the chance to meet. And this right of association 
involves a collective or communitarian element not necessarily present for 
mere speech. We may be able to speak spontaneously and as individuals, 
but we cannot communicate as a group unless we can gather as a group to 
share our ideas and aspirations. A group of our own choosing. The 
American Revolution might never have gotten off the ground if the Sons of 
Liberty had been required to allow the local Tories to participate in their 
deliberations.4 
It is one thing to allow individuals to say whatever they wish, and quite 
another to allow them to cooperate with others to decide what they wish to 
say as a group. Collective speech is potentially much more powerful than 
individual speech. It is also potentially much more dangerous or subversive 
to the government—which is why this right is qualified by the adverb 
“peaceably,” which was not thought necessary for speech, press, or petition. 
And thanks to John Page and others, this right of assembly and association 
is equally and independently protected by the First Amendment. If we 
prevent the government from regulating the content of what we say, but 
allow it to regulate and control the membership, leadership, or institutional 
structure of the groups that are the seedbed of ideas and communication, we 
will have given the government a powerful instrument for controlling 
speech, press, religion, assembly, and petition. To focus just on preventing 
content-based regulation of messages is not enough. 
Despite Sedgwick’s optimism, the right of groups to assemble and 
converse together would not remain uncontroversial for long. When, 
perhaps inspired by the Jacobin Clubs of Paris, opponents of the 
Washington-Hamilton administration organized so-called “Democratic-
Republican Societies” up and down the seaboard,5 many Federalists thought 
this was taking the freedom of association to dangerous extremes. Not only 
did the whole enterprise bear too strong a resemblance to things French—
never popular in America—but the Societies’ practice of holding meetings 
only among like-minded members struck many critics as a mark of 
conspiracy. When the so-called “Whiskey Rebellion” broke out in Western 
Pennsylvania, even the usually tolerant President George Washington was 
quick to connect the dots between the Societies and the Rebellion.  
 
4. I borrow the insight that modern freedom of association derives from freedom of assembly 
from Professor John Inazu. See JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF 
ASSEMBLY 20–25 (2012). 
5. For the historical background, see Robert M. Chesney, Democratic-Republican Societies, 
Subversion, and the Limits of Legitimate Political Dissent in the Early Republic, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1525 
(2004). 











Ironically, Sedgwick himself was among those who sought to use the 
power of Congress to condemn the clubs. But Madison and others fought 
for their right to freedom of assembly—what we would now call freedom 
of association—and fortunately, he mostly prevailed.6 Madison later called 
Washington’s attack on the Societies the worst mistake of his career.  
By the early nineteenth century, the propensity of Americans to form 
groups and associations of every possible shape and description—social 
groups, political groups in and out of power, religious societies, charitable 
groups, farm cooperatives, workers’ associations, you name it—had come 
to be the defining element in our national character. It was the first thing 
young Alexis de Tocqueville noticed when he and his friend Gustave de 
Beaumont set foot in Jacksonian America. Tocqueville, probably the most 
profound observer of the American spirit of liberty ever to put pen to paper, 
wrote that “[t]he most natural right of man, after that of acting on his own, 
is that of combining his efforts with those of his fellows and acting together. 
Therefore the right of association seems to me by nature almost as 
inalienable as individual liberty.” He commented that “[i]n our own day 
freedom of association has become a necessary guarantee against the 
tyranny of the majority.”7  
And by freedom of association Tocqueville and the early nineteenth 
century Americans did not just mean the ability of random crowds to meet 
on the public square, but of selective groups and associations to organize 
around shared beliefs. As Tocqueville explained: “An association simply 
consists in the public and formal support of specific doctrines by a certain 
number of individuals who have undertaken to cooperate in a stated way in 
order to make these doctrines prevail.” Abolitionists met in abolitionist 
conventions, Methodists prayed together in Methodist camp meetings, 
Whigs marched with other Whigs (and not a few barrels of hard cider) in 
campaign rallies, and the Masons did whatever they do in their mysterious 
lodges with fanciful names and exotic costumes. Diversity of opinion spread 
through diversity of groups. 
Just as the freedom of speech necessarily includes the freedom not to be 
compelled to affirm beliefs you do not share, the freedom of association 
necessarily includes the freedom to limit your association to persons who 
share your values and beliefs. Were it not so, outsiders and even adversaries 
to your perspective could have the power to alter or distort your message.  
Canadians often claim that their vision of pluralism is based on the 
mosaic rather than the melting pot. Whether that is an accurate reading of 
 
6. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 947–48 (1794) (adopting a watered-down version of the resolution, 
no longer mentioning the Democratic-Republican Societies by name).  
7. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J. P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence 













the difference between the two nations I am skeptical, but I do think the 
Canadians are right to emphasize the mosaic. Freedom of association is 
based on the mosaic. Each individual society is no more diverse and 
representative than the Democratic-Republican Societies or the Masons. 
Diversity and pluralism come from the peaceful coexistence of multitudes 
of associations. 
Supreme Court doctrine used to reflect this understanding. In an opinion 
a few decades ago, the Court stated that “the freedom to associate . . . 
necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the people who constitute 
the association, and to limit the association to those people only.”8 This was 
not a conservative principle and not a liberal principle, but a constitutional 
principle shared across the usual ideological divide. Justice William J. 
Brennan put it this way: 
There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal 
structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the 
group to accept members it does not desire. Such a regulation may 
impair the ability of the original members to express only those views 
that brought them together. Freedom of association therefore plainly 
presupposes a freedom not to associate.9  
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor agreed, in these words: “Protection of the 
association’s right to define its membership derives from the recognition 
that the formation of an expressive association is the creation of a voice, and 
the selection of members is the definition of that voice.”10 
Applying these principles, the Supreme Court protected the right of the 
NAACP not to reveal the names of its members, the right of political parties 
to exclude voters aligned with the other party from the process of choosing 
presidential nominees and to set their own qualifications for party officers, 
the right of religious organizations to hire members only of their faith to run 
their organizations, and—most recently and controversially—the right of 
the Boy Scouts of America to exclude a person “who openly declares 
himself to be a homosexual” from serving as a scoutmaster and role model.11 
Moreover, the Court made clear that a wide range of governmental 
actions—not just straightforward legal prohibitions—“may 
unconstitutionally infringe upon this freedom.”12 In two of the cases, the 
 
8. Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981). 
9. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). 
10. Id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
11. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107; Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); 
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 651 (2000). 
12. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.  











Court held that a group’s exercise of the freedom of association could not 
be used as the basis for excluding the group from a forum for speech. One 
of these, Healy v. James, involved a public university’s refusal to allow a 
‘60s radical student organization, the Students for a Democratic Society 
(SDS), to be a recognized student organization with a right to meet on 
campus and use the ordinary channels of communication.13 The second, 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 
involved a city’s denial of a permit to use public streets for a parade, on 
account of the group’s exclusion of a gay and lesbian contingent that wanted 
to march in the parade. The Court held, unanimously, that the parade 
organizers could not be denied a permit to use public property merely on 
account of their exercise of the freedom of association.14 
Even in its heyday, this right was not absolute. The government had the 
authority to enforce race and sex discrimination laws in the commercial 
sphere, against employers, businesses, and commercial associations like the 
traditional men’s eating clubs that used to be a barrier to women’s 
participation in commerce. In the most famous of these cases, Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees, the Court allowed the state of Minnesota to enforce 
a nondiscrimination law against the United States Jaycees, a private 
business networking organization previously open only to young men.15  
And the government could enforce antidiscrimination rules even against 
noncommercial expressive associations if restrictions on membership were 
logically unrelated to the group’s message or beliefs. Again, the Jaycees 
were the prime example. Their exclusion of women from voting 
membership had no logical connection to any positions the Jaycees took in 
the public arena. Justice Brennan put it this way:  
There is . . . no basis in the record for concluding that admission of 
women as full voting members will impede the organization’s ability 
to . . . disseminate its preferred views. The Act . . . imposes no 
restrictions on the organization’s ability to exclude individuals with 
ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing 
members.16  
That was the ground for disagreement among the Justices in the Boy Scouts 
case, too. Four of the Justices believed that homosexuality was not relevant 
to the Boy Scout’s message about being morally straight, but none of the 
Justices disputed that the Scouts, like other associations, have the right to 
 
13. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).  
14. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
15. Roberts, 468 U.S. 609. 













enforce membership or leadership restrictions that do, in fact, have a bearing 
on their organizational message and beliefs. 
This is how Supreme Court doctrine stood in 2010, when the Court 
granted certiorari in Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of 
California, Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez, in which I had the 
honor of representing the Petitioner:17 
o Private, noncommercial expressive associations have the clear 
constitutional right to confine those who vote on and control 
their message to persons who share their beliefs, even if those 
beliefs are contrary to governmental policy. 
o Groups may not be excluded from speech forums, including 
public university student activity recognition, on account of 
the exercise of their associational freedom. 
That should have made Christian Legal Society an easy case.  
The facts of the case are probably familiar. Hastings College of the Law 
is a public law school located in the heart of San Francisco, California. Like 
most, maybe all, public universities, Hastings allowed students to form 
groups to reflect their interests and commitments and gave those groups 
access to meeting space on campus, communications channels, and money 
for public events. The stipulated purpose of this campus forum program was 
“to promote a diversity of viewpoints among registered student 
organizations.”18 Among, not within. Mosaics, not melting pots. There were 
over sixty such groups, from frisbee teams to wine tasting, both a 
Democratic club and a Republican club, a pro-life and a pro-choice club, 
clubs based on race or ethnic identity, and at least three religious clubs. Only 
one group ever was excluded: the Christian Legal Society (CLS) student 
chapter. CLS was a tiny group, having maybe five or six members. Its 
principal activities were weekly Bible studies, speakers, dinners, and 
organizing transport to worship services. All its activities were open to all 
students, but its leadership and voting membership were limited to 
Christians, as defined by the organization’s Statement of Beliefs. The law 
school administration recognized the group for about a decade, until the 
group adopted a statement that sexual intimacy should be reserved for 
marriage, defined as a marriage between one man and one woman. Only 
students subscribing to this statement of beliefs could vote on the group’s 
 
17. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez 
(Christian Legal Society), 561 U.S. 661 (2010). 
18. Id. at 730 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Appendix at 261, Christian Legal Society, 561 U.S. 
661 (No. 08-1371)). 











policies and program, or speak in its name, as by leading the weekly Bible 
studies. 
The Hastings law school administration concluded that this requirement 
ran afoul of Hastings’s Nondiscrimination Policy. To be sure, the precise 
content of that policy was the subject of great confusion in the litigation. As 
written, the policy barred only the standard categories of discrimination. 
The only one of these that related to the organization’s beliefs was the 
prohibition on discrimination based on religion. All the other protected 
categories had to do with immutable characteristics like race, sex, disability, 
and sexual orientation. In its answer and interrogatory responses, Hastings 
stated that its Policy “permits political, social, and cultural student 
organizations to select officers and members who are dedicated to a 
particular set of ideals or beliefs.”19 CLS thus argued that Hastings’s policy 
discriminated on its face against religious groups, because political, social, 
cultural, and other viewpoint-based student groups were permitted to 
reserve membership and leadership positions to members who shared their 
beliefs. Only religious groups were denied this right, because “religion” was 
the only viewpoint-related characteristic in Hastings’s list of prohibited 
bases for discrimination.  
In the midst of discovery, however, Hastings declared for the first time 
that it actually had an unwritten policy that all student groups were required 
to accept all students and even let them vote and participate in leadership—
even if they did not share and even if they openly opposed the purposes and 
beliefs of the group.20 This it called the “all-comers policy,” meaning that 
all student groups had to be open to any student who wished to join.21 This 
policy avoided the explicit viewpoint discrimination problem of the written 
nondiscrimination policy, at the price of denying to every student group at 
Hastings the freedom of association right to limit themselves to members 
who share their beliefs. Joint Stipulations entered by both parties to the 
litigation attested to the existence of both the written nondiscrimination 
policy and the all-comers policy.22 The all-comers policy was never 
enforced against any group other than the Christian Legal Society chapter.23 
If actually enforced, the all-comers policy would mean that groups of all 
sorts would lose control over their identity. A Republican club would have 
to admit Democrats. An NAACP chapter would have to allow racist 
 
19. Joint Appendix at 93, Christian Legal Society, 561 U.S. 661 (No. 08-1371).  
20. The facts are described in detail in Justice Alito’s dissent. Christian Legal Society, 561 U.S. 
at 707–16 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
21. Kane Deposition at 49, Christian Legal Society, 561 U.S. 661 (No. 08-1371); Chapman 
Deposition at 29–31, Christian Legal Society, 561 U.S. 661 (No. 08-1371).  
22. See Joint Stipulations at 14–15, Christian Legal Society, 561 U.S. 661 (No. 08-1371) (written 
Nondiscrimination Policy); id. at 18 (all-comers policy). 













skinheads to sit in on its planning meetings. The environmentalist club 
would have to allow a global warming skeptic equal time at the microphone 
at a climate change rally. A member of Jews for Jesus, or an out and out 
anti-Semite, could demand an equal shot at leading the Jewish Law 
Students’ Torah study. Of course, smaller and less powerful groups are 
more likely to be harmed, because it is easier for them to be overwhelmed 
by attendees who are their ideological antagonists. But just as the written 
policy was blatantly viewpoint discriminatory as applied to religious 
groups, the all-comers policy violated the core principle of freedom of 
association of every group. As stated by Justice Brennan:  
There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal 
structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the 
group to accept members it does not desire. Such a regulation may 
impair the ability of the original members to express only those views 
that brought them together.24  
The Supreme Court upheld Hastings’s all-comers policy on its face, by 
a 5-4 vote. The Court did not address the constitutionality of the written 
policy and did not address the specific facts of the case about discriminatory 
enforcement. As discussed at length in Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, it 
is highly questionable whether the all-comers policy even existed apart from 
the litigation, and in light of Hastings’s failure to apply it to other 
organizations. But those problems are peculiar to one case only. It is the 
Court’s constitutional analysis that matters for the future. Accordingly, let 
us take the all-comers policy at face value and see how the Court managed 
to square it with principles of freedom of association. I submit that the 
Court’s reasoning should be worrisome to civil libertarians across the board, 
even those who may not think well of religious organizations. Hastings’s 
target was a Christian group whose views on sexual morality are anathema 
to the institution, but the doctrine announced by the Court could be used 
against any group whose beliefs are out of favor with the authorities. 
The Court’s reasoning involved two important doctrinal moves. First, the 
Court subsumed the freedom of association claim into the free speech claim. 
Freedom of association was the lynchpin of CLS’s argument against the all-
comers policy. But the Court held that the all-comers policy satisfied its test 
under the Free Speech Clause, on account of applying equally to all 
viewpoints.25 It then declined to treat the association claim independently, 
stating that it would be “anomalous” to protect freedom of association when 
 
24. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). 
25. Christian Legal Society, 561 U.S. at 694–95. 











a free speech claim arising in the same context fails.26 Holding that CLS’s 
“expressive-association and free-speech arguments merge,” the Court 
declined to apply its expressive association precedents.27  
Now I went to law school. I must have missed the class where they said 
you cannot bring two different constitutional claims arising from the same 
set of facts. I am genuinely baffled where the Court came up with this idea. 
But it is insidious, because freedom of speech and freedom of association 
do not protect exactly the same thing. They are closely intertwined, as the 
Court says, but they protect different aspects of expressive freedom. Under 
the Court’s speech cases, the central question is whether the government is 
neutral toward the particular message or viewpoint being expressed. Under 
the Court’s association cases, the central question is whether the regulation 
undermines the group’s ability to control its identity. 
These two rights are different. They have different elements. To “merge” 
the freedom of association right into the free speech claim and then say the 
group loses on freedom of association because it could not carry a free 
speech claim, means that freedom of association is written out of the 
Constitution. No one asked, in the Jaycees case, the Boy Scouts case, the 
Hurley parade case, or the political party cases, whether the challenged state 
laws discriminated against any particular viewpoint. It was enough if they 
were shown to force a group to admit people who did not share the group’s 
beliefs or ideology. 
Speech claims under the First Amendment focus on what the speaker 
said. That is why free speech doctrine applies strict scrutiny to regulation 
based on content and viewpoint, applying lesser scrutiny to content-neutral 
regulation of time, place, and manner. Associational rights have to do with 
the composition of the group. Under freedom of association precedents, all 
groups have the right to choose their leaders and their members even if the 
restriction is entirely viewpoint neutral, unless the group is attempting to 
exclude on a basis that is irrelevant to its message—an exception obviously 
inapplicable to the Christian Legal Society. Freedom of association is not 
about viewpoint neutrality; it is about every group’s right to be able to 
maintain control over its message by choosing its leaders and voting 
members. 
In effect, the Court did what Theodore Sedgwick urged and John Page 
opposed: it collapsed the First Amendment protection for freedom of 
association into the protection for speech. 
The Court’s second doctrinal move was even more damaging. It held that 
the freedom of association is protected only against outright government 
 
26. Id. at 681. 













compulsion and not against the denial of benefits. The Court explained that 
Hastings “is dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of 
prohibition.”28 And the Court said that freedom of association protects 
against regulations that “compel[]”—that word is in italics in the opinion—
a group to include unwanted members, but not regulations that penalize the 
group by denying it an otherwise generally available benefit.29 In doctrinal 
terms, the Court held that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not 
apply to freedom of association.  
There are two problems with that conclusion. The first is precedent. In 
the Jaycees case, Justice Brennan wrote for the Court: “Government actions 
that may unconstitutionally infringe upon this freedom [the freedom of 
expressive association] can take a number of forms. Among other things, 
government may seek to impose penalties or withhold benefits from 
individuals because of their membership in a disfavored group . . . .”30 For 
this proposition, he cited one of the public university speech forum cases, 
making it clear that denial of access to a campus forum can be a violation 
of the freedom of association right.31  
Precedent is thus plainly contrary to the Court’s conclusion, but so is 
logic. There is no reason why freedom of association would be any different 
from our other rights with respect to the right-privilege distinction. They all 
have the same structure. Americans have certain freedoms and the 
government may not impinge upon those freedoms by denying those who 
exercise them otherwise generally available benefits. As Justice Brennan 
explained in Speiser v. Randall, to deny an otherwise available right on 
account of exercise of a constitutional freedom is the equivalent of a “fine” 
for exercising that right.32 The Court used the unconstitutional conditions 
logic with respect to certain property-related rights in the 1920s. It extended 
the logic to freedom of speech in the 1950s, and to free exercise of religion 
in 1963. Most recently, the Court applied the logic to federalism, in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.33 I know of no 
constitutional right to which unconstitutional conditions doctrine has not 
been applied, other than freedom of association in the CLS case.  
 
28. Id. at 683. 
29. Id. at 682. 
30. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). 
31. Id. (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–184 (1972)).  
32. 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958). 
33. Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. 
Comm’n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583 (1926); Speiser, 357 U.S. 513; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 579–85 (2012); see generally Richard A. Epstein, 
The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits 
of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. 
L. REV. 1413 (1989).  











The Court gave no reason for confining the protection of freedom of 
association to the “stick of prohibition.”34 This seems to be a throwback to 
the days when Oliver Wendell Holmes could say that a policeman fired for 
criticizing an elected official “may have a constitutional right to talk 
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”35 The author 
of the CLS opinion has in recent years joined opinions holding that denial 
of the “carrot of subsidy”36 can violate other First Amendment freedoms.37 
It thus remains to be seen whether the departure in the CLS case signals a 
general retreat from the unconstitutional conditions doctrine across a range 
of cases, or just in freedom of association cases, or—quite possibly—just in 
this case alone.  
The framers of the Bill of Rights said little about what they meant by the 
First Amendment, but one thing we know: they regarded the four expressive 
freedoms of speech, press, petition, and assembly (or association) as distinct 
and worthy of separate mention. Unlike the modern Court, they saw the 
dangers in merging all such claims into the protection for speech. The 
Christian Legal Society case demonstrates the consequence of doing just 
that. 
 
34. See Christian Legal Society, 561 U.S. at 683. 
35. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
36. Christian Legal Society, 561 U.S. at 683. 
37. See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 214 (2013). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol97/iss6/9
